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This paper considers the issues which arise when a worker becomes incapacitated for 
work and suffers a long-term absence from work.  It examines the doctrine of 
frustration of the contract of employment and its contemporary application, and 
focuses particularly on a recent decision of Hilton Hotels of Australia Limited v 
Pasovska which purported to apply the important authority of Finch v Sayers which 
has been influential in the interpretation of the application of the doctrine in 
employment matters.  The paper also canvasses the effect of provisions in workers 
compensation statutes on frustration where the worker has been absent for a lengthy 
period and examines a number of cases where industrial tribunals have found unfair 
termination of employment of long term injured workers who have been dismissed 
without full consideration of their capacity for work.  The paper concludes by 
suggesting that the decision in Finch v Sayers should be reconsidered having regard 
to contemporary influences and changes in labour market regulations. 
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This paper considers the issues that arise when a worker becomes incapacitated for 
work and the contract of employment is put in peril by reason of long-term absence 
from work.  As a consequence it examines the doctrine of frustration of the contract 
of employment and its contemporary application, and the effect of provisions in 
workers compensation statutes on the frustration of contract of employment 
circumstances.  
 
The doctrine of frustration, in general terms, provides that a contract comes to an end 
by operation of law when the obligations become incapable of performance for 
reasons other than the parties’ conduct or behaviour, most typically in the 
employment context, the death or serious injury of the worker.  However, all State 
and Territory workers compensation statutes require employers to provide suitable 
duties to workers who are able to return to work, after a work related disability, 
within prescribed periods.3  These so called return to work provisions limit the 
prerogative of an employer to terminate a worker’s employment because they prevent 
the contract of employment from being terminated prior to the prescribed time limit.  
Arguably they also effect the operation of the doctrine of frustration.  In examining 
the interaction of these concepts the paper examines the contemporary application of 
the case of Finch v Sayers4 which has been influential in the interpretation of the 
application of the doctrine of frustration of contract in employment matters.  In the 
final section of this paper the decision in Finch v Sayers is reconsidered having regard 
to contemporary influences and changes in labour market regulations. 
 
Frustration of Contract of Employment 
 
The doctrine of frustration of contract, as it applies to the contract of employment, 
generally provides that the contract of employment will terminate without any action 
on behalf of the employer or worker where it can be established that either or both of 
the parties to the contract of employment is unable by reason of circumstances or 
events beyond their control to perform or complete the contract of employment.5  The 
event, which takes place, must be something which was not provided for or 
anticipated to be part of the terms of the contract.   
The law in relation to frustration of contract was recently reviewed by Ipp J in City of 
Subiaco  -v- Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd6 who observed (at para 71) that: 
 
In determining whether a frustrating event has occurred, regard 
may be had to all relevant circumstances. The evidence in question 
is not admitted so as to construe the contract and the parol evidence 
rule has no relevance. The purpose of the evidence is simply to show 
the change in obligations and that the contract cannot be performed 
                                                 
3  For example section 122 Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), section 84AA Workers Compensation 
and Rehabilitation Act 1981(WA), section 58B Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986  
(SA). 
4  [1976] 2 NSWLR 540 
5  Durham v Westrail [1995] WAIRC 56 at per Sharkey P referring to various authorities mentioned below 
6  [2001] WASCA 140 at paras 66-71 (emphasis added). 
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in the way contemplated by the parties. Thus, in Brisbane City 
Council v Group Projects Pty Ltd the economic and other 
consequences of the relevant event were examined. In Finch v 
Sayers [1976] 2 NSWLR 540, a case where it was said that a 
contract of employment had been frustrated, Wootten J took into 
account the nature of the illness of the employee, the prospects of 
recovery and other relevant matters. 7
Whether a contract of employment is frustrated is a question of law.8  In the first 
instance it is a matter of construction of the employment contract.9  This may require 
consideration of both the express and implied terms of the contract and as will be 
discussed below which terms if any can be implied.  In Davis Contractors Ltd v 
Fareham Urban District Council10 Lord Radcliffe said frustration occurs when "a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract". The party asserting that a 
contract has been frustrated bears the onus of proving not only the occurrence of the 
frustrating event or events, but also that these events were not caused by any default 
of that party11.   
 
Frustration of Contract in the Employment Context 
 
In the employment context, frustration of the contract of employment is most 
frequently at issue because the worker is unable to work due to illness.  The question 
then is whether the worker’s incapacity is likely to continue for such a length of time 
that further performance of the worker’s obligations in the future would either be 
impossible or would be a thing radically different from the original duties.12  The 
modern Australian rule in relation to frustration of employment contract as discussed 
in Finch v Sayers suggests that frustration of contract does not apply until all 
entitlements to sick leave; long service leave, annual leave and the like are 
exhausted.13  Importantly Finch v Sayers is also instructive as to which terms may 
suitably be implied where long-term illness is a consideration. 
 
Finch v Sayers 
 
The facts in Finch v Sayers were that Finch was employed as the general manager of 
an importing company between 1965 and 1973.  In 1970 his employer established a 
superannuation scheme which provided benefits to Finch and other employees.  
Benefits under the scheme were available to employees even if the employee was 
dismissed before retirement, unless the dismissal was due to conduct prejudicial to the 
employer’s interests or dereliction of duty.  Finch became ill in early 1973 and could 
not carry out his duties.  He recovered from the illness in late in 1973.  However in 
                                                 
7  Emphasis added.  Interestingly it was not the finding of Wooten J that the contract in question was 
frustrated as implied by Ipp J. 
8  Tsarkiroglou and Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl Gmbh [1962] AC 93. 
9  The Eugenia [1964] 2 QB 226 Per Lord Denning at 239-40. 
10  [1956] AC 656 at 729.  These principles were also accepted by the High Court in Codelfa Construction 
Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
11  F C Shepherd and Co Ltd v Jerrom [1987] 1 QB 301.  
12  Marshall v Harland and Wolff [1972] 1 WLR 899 at 904. 
13  [1976] 2 NSWLR 540 
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July 1973 he was dismissed; the employer maintaining that the dismissal was due to 
“conduct prejudicial to the company’s interests or dereliction of duty”.  It was argued 
that Finch was therefore not entitled to the superannuation benefits.  When the matter 
came to court Wooten J held that Finch’s dismissal was due to his illness.  The 
employer also argued that Finch’s contract was frustrated due to the illness and that is 
operated to defeat his claim to benefits under the scheme.  In relation to the question 
of frustration of contract, in a long and careful judgment Wootten J observed (at 547): 
 
The proper starting point is today the same a that adopted by the 
judges in those days namely to ask what are the terms of the 
contract under consideration, and, where the express terms provide 
no answer, to ask what terms may be reasonably implied in a 
contract of the relevant sort, made between people in the position of 
the parties, assuming them to be reasonable men according to the 
standards of the day… 
In this community the legislatures have either directly, or through 
the arbitration tribunals which they have set up, established a 
considerable array of minimum standards governing the rights of an 
employee to absent himself from work.  Some of these provisions 
apply to all employees, including award-free executives, eg Annual 
Holidays Act 1944, Long Service Leave Act 1955.  They may of 
course, be rendered inconsistent by federal awards, but these 
invariably make their own provision on such matters.  Even where 
the legislation has stipulated the minimum standard only through 
awards, as is the case of sick leave under s 88c of the Industrial 
Arbitration Act 1940, the effect has rubbed off on to award-free 
employees such as executives, who are commonly accorded more 
favourable terms. 
 
At 558 Wooten concluded that; 
 
…it may well be that, in many areas of employment in contemporary 
society, particularly where one is dealing with an indefinitely 
continuing relationship, and not the performance of a specific task, 
there is relatively little room for the operation of the doctrine of 
frustration due to illness. 14
 
Thus after about 9 months of illness Finch’s contract was held not to be frustrated.  
Finch v Sayers has had a weighty influence of contract of employment cases.  
Although Wooten J cited the English decision of Marshall v Harland and Wolff15with 
approval it is arguable that there has been a difference in the application of the 
doctrine of frustration in the two jurisdictions.16  This aspect is discussed below. 
 
                                                 
14  Emphasis given.  
15  [1972] 1 WLR 899. 
16  A comprehensive survey of authorities appears in Egge and Peira v Department of Corrective Services 
[1991] NSWIRC 19 (4 October 1991). 
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A Brief Review of the English Authorities 
 
The limited application given to the doctrine of frustration by Wootten J in Finch v 
Sayers17 differs in some respects with a number of contemporary English decisions 
which suggest that there is room for frustration of contract due to illness18.  For 
example in Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Ltd v Lebibovici19 the English Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that frustration of the contract of employment was 
possible in a situation where the worker under a short term periodic contract had been 
absent from work for only 5 months.  In that case Phillips J. said (at 377): 
 
It is possible to divide into two kinds the events relied upon as 
bringing about the frustration of a short-term periodic contract of 
employment. There may be an event (e.g. a crippling accident) so 
dramatic and shattering that everyone concerned will realise 
immediately that to all intents and purposes the contract must be 
regarded as at an end.  Or there may be an event, such as illness or 
accident, the course and outcome of which is uncertain.  It may be a 
long process before one is able to say whether the event is such as 
to bring about the frustration of the contract. But there will have 
been frustration of the contract, even though at the time of the event 
the outcome was uncertain, if the time arrives when, looking back, 
one can say that at some point (even if it is not possible to say 
precisely when) matters had gone on so long, and the prospects for 
the future were so poor, that it was no longer practical to regard the 
contract as still subsisting.20
 
Likewise in Hart v A R Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd21 a worker who contracted 
industrial dermatitis in April 1974 was told by his employer in January 1976 that even 
though he was capable of returning to work there was no job for him.  The EAT held 
the contract had been frustrated, noting that the applicant was a “key worker” and that 
it was reasonable in the circumstances that he had been replaced.  More recently in 
Notcutt v Universal Equipment Co (London) Ltd22 the English Court of Appeal held 
that a submission that a contract of employment was frustrated was made out after a 
worker who had a heart attack in late 1983 at aged 63 did not thereafter return to 
work.  The worker and employer accepted that the worker was not going to work 
again following a discussion with reference to a medical report in mid 1984.  The 
worker was given notice of termination by the employer and applied for sick pay 
under relevant English legislation.  On appeal, the Court noted that the payment of 
sick pay was dependent on termination of the contract by the employer.  The Court 
                                                 
17  An earlier Australian case of Simmons Ltd v Hay (1964) 81 WN (Pt1) (NSW) 358 determined that a 
printery engineer was permanently incapacitated so he was not able to discharge his duties thus frustrating 
the contract.  The facts in Finch v Sayers were not dissimilar given that Finch had been absent from work 
for an extended period.  
18  A discussion of the cases noted appears in McGarry G, J (1987) 'Master and servant - incapacitating 
illness of servant - frustration of employment contract'. Australian Law Journal 61 (1) January 35-36, 
McMullen, J (1977) 'Termination of the contract of employment by frustration'. New Law Journal 
127(5819) 15 September 905-907, Manchester, C (1978) 'Frustration or dismissal?' New Law Journal 128 
(5861) 13 July 674-676 and Samuels, A, L (1976) 'Frustration of contract'. Solicitors' Journal 121 (2) 14 
January 25-26. 
19  [1977] ICR 260. 
20  Emphasis added. 
21  [1977] 1 WLR 1067. 
22  [1986] 1 WLR 641. 
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held that the contract had ended by virtue of frustration and not by the employer’s 
notice.  The decision indicates that the result in Notcutt was initially (as Wooten J had 
noted in Finch v Sayers) dependent on interpretation of the contract.  In effect it was 
held that the contract was not intended to cover circumstances in which a totally 
disabled worker could continue to remain employed.  This approach is consistent with 
Finch v Sayers to the extent the Wooten J also observed that the starting point in such 
cases is to consider the express and implied terms of the contract. 
 
In perhaps the most important English decision (which as noted was cited with 
approval in Finch v Sayers23) is Marshall v Harland and Wolff24 where Sir John 
Donaldson stated that "as a matter of law it is quite unnecessary to be able to point to 
a precise point of time at which the relationship was dissolved".  In Marshall it was 
suggested that in order to determine whether the contract was frustrated by reason of 
illness or disability it was necessary to take into account the terms of the contract, 
including any sick leave provisions; how long the employment was likely to last in 
the absence of illness, the nature of the employment, the nature of the illness and how 
long it had already continued, the prognosis, and the period of past employment.25  
  
In Marshall the facts, (which are seldom referred to in the judgments which cite the 
decision of Sir John Donaldson with approval), were that the applicant worker was 
employed by the respondent employer from 1949 as a shipyard fitter.  He became ill 
in October 1969 and did not return to work.  In 1971 the employer decided to close 
down the shipyards in which the worker had been engaged and gave him four weeks 
notice of termination of employment.  The worker contested the notice on the grounds 
that he had been made redundant and should have been entitled to a redundancy 
payment which had been denied him by the employer.  It is significant that the 
employer made no provision for sick pay and the worker had not been paid any wages 
during his absence.  It had not been the practice of the employer to terminate workers 
on grounds of sickness.  Medical evidence showed that the worker would not have 
been able to return to work at the time of hearing but following an operation the 
worker believed he would be able to return.   Donaldson P held that the contract of 
employment was not frustrated as there was no evidence that the worker would be 
permanently incapacitated.  Surprisingly, given the attention to this part of the 
judgment in subsequent cases it was noted by Donaldson P that frustration was only 
‘faintly argued’ by the employer.  Further he found that there were no grounds for 
holding that further performance of the contract was radically different or impossible 
to perform.  In effect it was held that the termination was due to redundancy.   
 
In Marshall there are several factual similarities with Finch v Sayers.  In both 
Marshall and Finch the workers had been engaged over long periods, but neither 
contract of employment included a provision for sick leave and perhaps consequently 
the employers tolerated long periods of absence before taking any action to terminate 
the contracts of employment.  In both cases the claims were made for payments other 
than compensation for unfair or wrongful dismissal.  Likewise and perhaps most 
significant to the results in both cases, the medical evidence was inconclusive as to 
ongoing incapacity.  In Finch a key element was the necessity to show that a term of 
the contract was an implied term which provided for sick leave.  It is notable however 
that Finch was an award free executive employee, whereas Marshall was not in an 
                                                 
23  At 557-558. 
24  [1972] 1 WLR 899. 
25  [1972] 1 WLR 899 at 903-4. 
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executive position and was protected by the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (UK) 
and the Contract of Employment Act 1963(UK).  The result in both cases was a 
finding that the contracts were not frustrated.  Importantly Donaldson P, in contrast to 
Wooten J in Finch, noted (at 721): 
 
If he will never again be able to work, or if the period of incapacity 
has been or will be sufficiently long, the relationship of employer 




The Effect of Awards on the Doctrine of Frustration 
 
Finch v Sayers was recently followed in Hilton Hotels of Australia Limited v 
Pasovska.26  In Pasovska the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission held 
that frustration of contract had not occurred in February 2000 even though the worker 
had ceased work with the appellant in 1993.  The worker had suffered an injury to her 
back in 1989 and due to this injury became progressively incapacitated.  She ceased 
work in November 1993 and in compensation proceedings in 1995 was declared to be 
totally incapacitated.  She did not resign her position and the employer took no action 
to terminate her employment.  In 1999 the worker’s solicitor wrote to her employer 
making a demand for unpaid leave, which was eventually paid to the worker in 
February 2000 calculated on the basis that her employment had ceased in 1995.  The 
worker took issue with the calculation of the payments and the matter proceeded to 
the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission on the question of whether the 
worker’s contract of employment was still on foot after 1995.  The Commission 
observed that most cases dealing with frustration of contract had not been decided in 
the context of industrial awards or agreements.  The Full Court said; 
 
40 Since the judgment of Wootten J in Finch v Sayers there does 
not appear to have been, with one possible exception, any 
Australian decision which has applied the doctrine to award 
employment. Although standard texts recognise the existence of the 
doctrine in this area, that cannot be decisive. For example, 
Professors Carter and Harland deal with the matter in this way in 
the 4th edition (2002) of their Contract Law in Australia 
(Butterworths) at p 776 in paragraph [2015]:  
41 Where the contract does not involve a specific task, but 
instead envisages a long-term relationship, it will be more difficult 
to establish that the contract has been frustrated by a temporary 
incapacity. Apart from the difficulty of identifying the period of the 
incapacity, and its impact on the contract, modern contracts of 
employment frequently contain provisions dealing with sickness 
benefits. Moreover, superannuation schemes frequently provide for 
retirement in the event of permanent medical incapacity. These may 
leave little room for discharge under the doctrine of frustration. But 
if an employee is incapacitated for what will, in all probability, be 
an unreasonably long period of time, the contract must usually be 
frustrated… 
42  On the other hand, the reliance by the courts on the doctrine 
of frustration in the area of employment law has been the subject of 
some criticism by academic commentators (for example, Collins, 
Ewing & McColgan, Labour Law: Text and Materials, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2001, pp 535 - 540). As Bristow J, sitting in the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal, said in a case cited in that volume, 
Harman v Flexible Lamps Ltd [1980] IRLR 418 at 419:  
                                                 
26  [2003] NSWIRC 17. 
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In the employment field the concept of discharge by operation of 
law, that is frustration, is normally only in play where the contract 
of employment is for a long term which cannot be determined by 
notice.27 Where the contract is terminable by notice, there is really 
no need to consider the question of frustration and if it were the law 
that, in circumstances such as are before us in this case, an 
employer was in a position to say 'this contract has been frustrated', 
then that would be a very convenient way in which to avoid the 
provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act. In 
our judgment, that is not the law in these sort of circumstances.  
43  The situation in this State is however affected, as it is in all 
Australian jurisdictions, by comprehensive long service leave 
legislation. The New South Wales Long Service Leave Act 1955 was 
one of the examples given by Wootten J in Finch v Sayers of a 
situation in this community which his Honour described as the 
establishing of "a considerable array of minimum standards 
governing the rights of an employee to absent himself from work". 
That statute, however, has a number of significances in the present 
situation. First, it is the basis of one of the respondent's claims 
before the magistrate and before this Court. Second, a 
consideration of its terms shows the limited scope for the operation 
of the doctrine in award regulated employment.  
44  The Long Service Leave Act provides valuable benefits to an 
employee, the existence and quantum of which depend, not upon 
work - as payment of wages often does, but on continuing service or 
employment. Section 4(1) of the statute provides that "every worker 
shall be entitled to long service leave on ordinary pay in respect of 
the service of the worker with an employer". Sections 4(4) and 
4(4A) provide that the long service leave is exclusive of annual 
holidays and public holidays during the period of leave. 28
 
A Closer Look at Pasovska. 
 
The judgment of Pasovska bears closer examination.  The Commission relied on a 
combination of citations from established texts (which no doubt in turn relied on 
Finch v Sayers), together with a selective combination of English authority.  For 
example, it appears that the comments in the final sentence in paragraph 41 the 
opinion of the learned authors referred to (which supports a finding that a contract 
could be frustrated) did not carry much weigh, given that the worker in this case had 
been absent from work for over 7 years at the time the matter went on appeal.  
Importantly the authorities cited in support for the view that the failure to give notice 
is critical, in paragraph 42 above are English, but there does not appear to be 
reference to another line of English cases cited herein which resulted in findings that 
the contract of employment had been frustrated.  In Marshall, Donaldson P had made 
it clear (at 719) that it was not necessary to point to a definite time at which the 
relationship was dissolved by frustration.  In addition, there does not appear to be any 
                                                 
27  This is a curious comment given there is an abundance of English authority to the contrary view. 
28  Emphasis added. 
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authority upon which Bristow J (sitting in the EAT) in Harman v Flexible Lamps Ltd 
asserts that “(w)here the contract is terminable by notice, there is really no need to 
consider the question of frustration”.  Although reference is made (in paragraph 42 of 
the judgment) to the potential to avoid the consequences of the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act (UK) to support the aforesaid proposition.  There is in 
fact contrary English authority on this point.  In Notcutt v Universal Equipment Co 
(London) Ltd above Dillon LJ citing the same Act referred to the issue of the 
availability of notice at 645-6, he said; 
 
For my part, as a periodic contract of employment determinable by 
short notice or relatively short, notice may none the less be intended 
in many cases by both parties to last for many years and as the 
power of the employer to terminate the contract by notice is subject 
to the provisions for the protection of employees against unfair 
dismissal now in the [Employment Protection Consolidation] Act 
1978, I see no reason in the principle why such a periodic contract 
of employment should not, in appropriate circumstances, be held to 
have been terminated without notice by frustration according to the 
accepted and long established doctrine of frustration in our law of 
contract.  The mere fact that the contract can be terminated by the 
employer by relatively short notice cannot of itself render the 
doctrine of frustration inevitably inapplicable.29
 
It might be argued that Pasovska was not a case involving a periodic short-term 
contract and that these comments are not apposite, nevertheless the comments of 
Dillon LJ on the question of notice are important.  It is clear from the decision in 
Pasovska that considerable reliance is placed upon the fact that notice provisions in 
the award could have been utilised by the employer to terminate the workers 
employment.  The weight attached to this latter issue by the Commission is arguably 
disproportionate and consequently a departure from Finch v Sayers.  Wooten J did not 
refer specifically to this question.  He did note (at 558) that in Marshall the question 
of whether notice had been given was a factor which the courts could take into 
account in determining whether the changed circumstances were so fundamental as to 
strike at the root of the relationship.  The question of notice in relation to short term 
periodic contracts was specifically addressed at length in Hart v A R Marshall & Sons 
(Bulwell) Ltd.30 Phillips J (for the majority) said (at 542-3): 
 
Experience in such cases shows that parties very often drift along in 
this situation for long periods of time during which the employee 
has ceased to do any work, or to be able to do any work, but has not 
been formally dismissed.  The legal position seems to be that the 
employee is still employed although he is not in receipt of wages, 
and that his employment continues until he is dismissed or the 
contract is frustrated and comes to an end by operation of law.  In 
these circumstances, while we think it right to attach considerable 
importance in a case of this kind to the failure by the employer to 
dismiss, it is we think, impossible to say that unless the employee is 
dismissed the contract must always be taken to continue.  To do so 
                                                 
29  Emphasis added. 
30  [1977] ICR 539 (Emphasis added). 
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would be tantamount to saying that frustration cannot occur in the 
case of short-term periodic contracts of employment….  In truth the 
employers are in a difficulty in this connection.  First of all, if they 
dismiss the employee prematurely they may be said to have 
dismissed him unfairly: here we have suggested that the test is 
whether the employer can reasonably be expected to wait any 
longer: Spencer v Paragon Wallpapers [1977] ICR 301.  Secondly, 
if the employer takes on a temporary replacement pending the 
recovery of the sick employee, there is a risk that he will be obliged 
to pay him compensation if he dismisses him when the sick employee 
has recovered; and even if he guides himself by our decision in 
Terry v East Sussex County Council [1976] ICR 536 he is probably 
buying litigation. 
 
Furthermore, we are very conscious of the fact – and attach much 
importance to it- that if frustration can never occur in such cases 
employers will feel obliged to dismiss employees in cases where 
they at present do not do so.  In the long run, it is the employees 
who would be the losers. 
 
In our judgment it comes to this.  The failure of the employer to 
dismiss the employee is a factor, and an important factor, to take 
into account when considering whether the contract of employment 
has been frustrated.  But it is not conclusive.  The important 
question, perhaps, is to look to see what was the reason for the 
failure.  It may be due to the fact that the employer did not think that 
the time had arrived when he could not reasonably wait any longer, 
in which case it is a piece of evidence of the greatest value.  Or it 
may be a cases where the failure to dismiss is attributed to the 
simple fact that the employer never applied his mind to the question 
at all.
 
It can be seen that Phillips J was alert to the potential for workers to be harmed if in 
fact the doctrine of frustration was not applied in circumstances where notice had not 
been given.  What is the impact of these authorities on the Australian cases?  
Arguably they can be distinguished as they deal with short-term periodic contract; 
however it is hard to see this as a relevant factor, if the potential for the employer to 
give notice is the same in each case.  Hart v A R Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd does 
not appear to have been considered in Pasovska although Marshall v Harland and 
Wolff and Notcutt v Universal Equipment Co (London) Ltd were cited with 
approval.31  Yet Hart v A R Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd is still regarded as sound 
authority by the United Kingdom Employment Appeals Tribunal.32  The focus of the 
                                                 
31  These cases have also been consistently followed in UK, see for example recent examples in Bateman v 
Watts [2001] UKEAT 338_00_2611at para 18, Collins v The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
[2001] UKEAT 1460_99_3101 at para 21 and Verner v Derby City Council and Others [2003] EWHC 
2708 at para 63. 
32  Cited with approval in Hogan v Cambridgeshire County Council [2001] UKEAT 0382_99_2607.  There 
are some UK cases where frustration has not been made out for long term absences, for example Maxwell 
v Walter Hamilton Designs [1975] IRLR 105 which decided that a contract of employment was not 
frustrated when worker who had been absent from work for 18 months. 
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New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission in Pasovska appears to be the 
broad question of whether frustration of contract has any application to the contract of 
employment, rather than the specific question of whether the contract would be either 
impossible or radically different from those existing under the terms of 
employment?33   In Pasovska the worker was protected by an award, which among 
other things set out the means by which a worker could be given notice.  No notice 
has ever been given by the employer in Pasovska.  The Full Bench seemed to attach 
considerable and arguably excessive significance to this and concluded; 
 
54 Notwithstanding this situation, we do not consider that the 
circumstances of the respondent's employment, including its history, 
the nature of the employment, the nature of the award coverage and 
the circumstances in which payment of accrued entitlements came to 
be made, permit any available scope for the operation of the 
doctrine of frustration.  In any event, we do not consider that the 
appellant has discharged the onus on it in that respect. We do not 
consider that the respondent's employment, regulated by 
comprehensive award provisions and statutes such as the Long 
Service Leave Act, could be said to require for its effective 
operation implied terms as to termination of employment or provide 
any basis for the doctrine to operate. The employer had ready 
means of terminating employment at short notice and incapacity of 
a worker would, subject to any other statutory protection (see, for 
example, the present s 93 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996), 
provide a readily available basis for termination of employment.34  
 
The Full Bench declared that the worker’s employment had continued up until 
February 2000 when the employer had forwarded what it thought were the correct 
leave entitlements to the worker.  In effect this meant the worker had remained 
employed since 1993 notwithstanding that she had not worked for nearly 7 years and 
had been declared totally incapacitated for work in 1995.  At this point is worth 
returning to the facts in Finch v Sayers.  It is noteworthy that in Finch v Sayers the 
worker was an executive who had been absent from work for less than a year.  In 
addition Finch actually recovered from his illness.  In Pasovska the worker never 
recovered and was declared totally incapacitated for work.  There is a clear distinction 
to be made on the facts.  Wooten J in citing Marshall v Harland and Wolff with 
approval required that a tribunal give attention to a range of factors.  The English 
authorities suggest that no one factor is determinative.  The failure of an employer to 
give notice needs to be weighed against all of the other factors.  In Pasovska it is clear 
that the employer “never applied his mind to the question (of notice) at all” which is 
hardly surprising because the worker had been declared totally incapacitated for work 
by a competent tribunal and was paid workers compensation in accordance with that 
declaration.  With respect the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission 
does not appear to have attached sufficient weight to that very important factor and 
erred in law.  It also failed to distinguish Finch v Sayers on the facts.  Clearly there is 
no comparison on the facts between the cases.   
 
                                                 
33  Per Donaldson in Marshall v Harland and Wolff [1972] 2All ER 715 at 718. 
34  Emphasis added. 
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There is a line of cases which suggests that if the employer behaves in a way that is 
consistent with the contract of employment continuing, such as continuing to liaise 
and accept sickness certificates from the worker, that the employer will be estopped 
from invoking the doctrine of frustration or denying that the worker has a continuing 
expectation of work.35  On the facts this was not the case in Pasovska.  The employer 
seems to have had virtually no contact with the worker from 1995 (when the Chief 
Justice of the Compensation Court of New South Wales held she was totally 
incapacitated as from November 1993) until November 1999 when her solicitor wrote 
to the employer seeking to engage the employer in discussions concerning payment of 
entitlements. 
 
The Consequences of Pasovska 
 
Since the publication of the decision in Pasovska some consternation has been 
expressed as to its likely effect.  A number of law firms issued client newsletters 
advising that employers should expressly terminate the contract of employment when 
an employee becomes totally incapacitated for work.  Payment of accrued annual 
leave and long service leave would not, it was suggested be determinative by itself.36  
The Pasovska decision highlights the necessity for the employer to give express 
notice to a worker in accordance with any award or industrial agreement.37  The 
prediction made by Phillips J in Hart v A R Marshall & Sons (Bulwell) Ltd has in fact 
come to pass.  It might be that Pasovska was a (somewhat unexpected) victory for one 
worker but it may be that the decision has negative consequence for other workers. 
 
One factor which needs to be considered is that The requirement of employers to give 
notice (to work injured workers) has to take account of the return to work provisions 
which are contained in the various Australian State workers compensation Acts.  
These provisions whilst not uniform generally provide that an employer of an worker 
who has suffered a work-related injury or disease is obliged to provide employment 
for that worker for up to 12 months from the date of the disability.  The effects of the 
return to work provisions are discussed below. 
 
Pasovska also raises the question of the appropriate length of time before an employer 
can give notice in the case of a worker who apparently cannot return to work?  The 
Industrial Commission of South Australia dealt with this issue in Filsell v District 
Council of Barossa38.  Filsell was a weekly paid employee whose sick leave credits 
had all been used.  He has on unpaid sick leave for twelve months prior to his 
dismissal.  The Commission held that the period of twelve months following the 
expiration of sick leave credits before notice of termination was given was 
                                                 
35  Fisher v Edith Cowan University (No2) 1997 WA Industrial Relations Commission 464 at 472 
(continuing expectations of employment where short term contract), Norfolk CC v Secretary of State for 
the Environment [1973] 3 All ER 673 (acceptance of medical certificates) and Hebden v Forsey & Son 
[1973] ICR 607(failure to give notice). 
36  P Copeland “Doctrine of Frustration of Little Application Where Employee Unable to Perform 
Employment Contract Due to Incapacity” Workplace Corrs June 2003 p 8. “Award Employment not 
Subject to ‘Frustration’ Doctrine”  Client Update Employment & Industrial Relations Bulletin No 2 April 
2003 Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers Workplace and Employee Relations Law Update – June 2003 Mallesons 
Stephen Jacques. 
37  Although as a matter of law, if a contract is frustrated there is no need to give notice per Denny, Mott and 
Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser and Co Ltd [1944] AC 265. 
38  [1992] SAIR 102. 
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reasonable.  Importantly in Filsell the Commission observed39 that there was no 
reliable medical evidence that would indicate that the worker was fit to return to 
work. 
 
This issue was also touched on in Vegh v Santos Ltd40.  In Vegh the respondent 
employed the worker for 19 years.  He suffered from manic depression.  He was able 
to continue work for the respondent throughout this period although he was given 
written advice that his performance was deficient.  He ceased work in October 1991 
and was hospitalised on at least two occasions.  In April 1992 the worker was 
dismissed whilst in hospital undergoing treatment.  Notice of the worker’s dismissal 
was given to his medical practitioner who had attended a meeting on the workers 
behalf, as he was too ill to attend personally.   The worker bought a claim for unfair 
dismissal.  A central issue in the case was that the worker had not been given the 
option of resigning in order to take advantage of a superannuation scheme which 
provided for total disablement nor was this drawn to his attention.  It was held that 
insufficient time had been allowed to elapse before notice was given.  In part this was 
because of a failure to properly assess the available medical evidence. 
 
A similar decision to Vegh is Frankcom v Tempo Services Pty Ltd41.   In Frankcom 
the worker was employed as a part time cleaner from July 1992 who injured her lower 
back in December 1993.  She was certified unfit for work as from January 1994.  She 
attempted to return to lighter duties in March and April 1994 without success.  She 
was dismissed in May 1994.  Deputy President Stevens summarised the authorities 
thus: 
 
Distilled to their essence, the key considerations appear to be 
whether a reasonable period of time elapsed between the date of 
injury and the date of the dismissal, and in that respect, whether 
there was a pressing or other necessity requiring the employer to 
take action to terminate, whether the employee had acted properly 
towards the employer in terms of conduct and rehabilitation and 
whether there was a consultation about the absence with the 
employee and attempts made to explore alternatives to dismissal  
The cases with respect to what constitutes a ‘reasonable period of 
time’ seemed to cover the question from the perspective of both 
employee and employer.  From the employee’s perspective, did the 
employee have reasonable length of service and an expectation of 
ongoing permanent employment, and furthermore did the employee 
take all reasonable steps towards rehabilitation.  From the 
employer’s perspective, did the employer suffer a detriment from the 
absence of the employee, and did it have difficulty in making 
arrangements to carry on its operations in the employee’s 
absence?42
 
                                                 
39  In doing so the Commission may have come dangerously close to reversing the onus on proof suggested 
in cases discussed above that the employer must prove that he worker cannot return to work. 
40  [1994] SAIRC 7. 
41  [1994] SAIR 80. 
42  At 4. 
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Interestingly these cases do not seem to have been cited elsewhere, in relation to the 
question of notice43.  This probably reflects the influence of the provisions of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) which make it unlawful to dismiss a worker on 
the grounds of temporary incapacity, as well as the increased use of provisions in 
State anti-discrimination legislation and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
which prevent discrimination on the grounds of disability.  In addition the return to 
work provisions in State workers compensation legislation influence the period over 
which an employer must retain the services of a worker with a work related disability.  
These latter provisions are discussed below. 
 
Workers’ Compensation Rehabilitation and Return to Work Provisions 
 
In an effort to address the issue of return to work for disabled workers all States have 
inserted provisions in their workers compensation legislation which attempts to 
provide some employment security for disabled workers as part of a rehabilitation 
process.  These provisions commonly require the employer to attempt to re-employ a 
disabled worker if the worker is able to recommence some form of work within 12 
months of the date of injury or the onset of disease.44  The obligations on employers 
usually do not apply if it is not “reasonably practicable” to provide “suitable duties” 
or if the worker has been dismissed on the grounds of “serious and willful 
misconduct.” 45   
 
There are a number of noteworthy features of the return to work provisions.  Firstly, 
with few exceptions they provide a penalty for employers who do not comply and are, 
therefore, in essence criminal provisions rather than provisions that create any 
enforceable rights for workers.  This point was made in a case before the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission where allegations of unlawful or unfair dismissal 
had been made.  In Fernandez v COM group Supplies Pty Ltd46, Ritter JR considered 
a case where a worker had been dismissed in the course of a rehabilitation program.  
The employer maintained that the worker had abandoned her duties, while the 
employee maintained that she had gone home sick from her work injury.  Ritter JR 
found the employer in breach of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) and ordered 
payment of compensation for unfair dismissal.  In relation to section 84AA of the 
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981(WA) which is a return to work 
provision he noted as an aside that; 
 
I find that but for the respondent's contravention of the (Industrial Relations) Act 
the employee would have been likely to have remained employed with the 
                                                 
43  Vegh v Santos Ltd has been cited with approval in Zemgailis v Hi Trans Express Pty Ltd [2002] SAIR 20 
in relation to the requirement of an employer to properly advise an employee of his/her entitlements on 
resignation. 
44 These types of provisions have a long pedigree. Commencing with provisions which deemed partially 
incapacitated workers as totally incapacitated where the employer could not provide employment. Most 
notable is section 11 of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) which provided that in the event that 
the employer was not able to provide suitable work for the partially disabled worker the employer would 
(subject to certain requirements) be obliged to pay the worker as thought they were totally incapacitated. 
There is a considerable body of cases that discuss the concept of “mutuality” which describes the 
obligation of the worker to be ready willing and able to accept suitable duties when offered by the 
employer. See for example R. J Brodie (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Pennell (1968) 117 CLR 665 and Dowell 
Australia Ltd v Archdeacon (1975) 132 CLR 417. In Dowell Mason J described the burden imposed on 
the employer by section 11 as “intolerable”. 
45  Section 84AA of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (WA). 
46  AIRC Print (950656) 22 June 1995. 
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respondent. Indeed, Mr. Melville drew to my attention Section 84AA of the 
Workers’' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act (Western Australia) 1981 (as 
amended). The effect of the section is to make it an offence if an employer does 
not preserve the employment of a "worker” injured at work for a period of 
twelve months from the date of the incapacity. Further, Section 84AA (4) 
excludes periods of total incapacity for work in calculating the 12 month period. 
The applicant's injury occurred on 5 July 1994, so the employer would have had 
to preserve her employment until beyond 4 July 1995, given her periods of total 
incapacity for work.47
 
The question of whether such a return-to-work provision gives rise to a duty of the 
employer to provide work, or re-employ a disabled worker, or gives rise to any 
private rights on the part of disabled workers, was discussed by the Victorian 
Supreme Court in Gardiner v State of Victoria.48  In Gardiner, the worker had 
resigned but then claimed a right to re-employment.  Section 122 of the Accident 
Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) (the Victorian equivalent to section 84AA) was 
considered not to create any private civil rights for workers.  Thus in most cases an 
employer, who does not comply with such a provision, by providing suitable work for 
a current employee may be liable for no more than a fine.49  Given the decision in 
Gardiner, return-to-work provisions such as section 122 of the Accident 
Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), and probably in other States such as Western Australia 
(which is similar), do not currently provide any right to suitable duties if the contract 
of employment has been terminated at the volition of the worker.  
 
Section 84AA of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (WA) was 
specifically referred to by Commissioner Beech in Stockwin v Cablesands Pty Ltd.50 
The employee submitted that he could not be dismissed because section 84AA 
prevented the employer from dismissing the employee within 12 months of the date 
that compensation was first paid.  The Commissioner accepted that section 84AA 
required the employer to preserve the employee’s position for 12 months until the 
employee returned to work, unless the employee was dismissed for serious and willful 
misconduct.  The Commissioner found that section 84AA had no application in this 
case, because the employee had not been able to return to work within the 12-month 
period prescribed.  He noted that despite section 84AA, it was still possible for the 
employer to dismiss the employee.  He also observed that even if the Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (WA) prohibited a specific act; it did not 
necessarily mean that the act done had no effect.   He noted however, that a dismissal 
in such circumstances might amount to an unfair dismissal.51  It might also be that 
reinstatement was an appropriate remedy for the employee/worker. Commissioner 
Beech also made reference to section 84AA in Pacey v Modular Masonry.52  In 
Pacey, the worker claimed his dismissal was unfair because he was receiving 
workers’ compensation.  He relied on section 84AA. The Commissioner observed: 
 
Therefore, if an employer does dismiss an employee who is absent from work on 
Workers’ compensation for a reason other than serious or willful misconduct, 
                                                 
47  Emphasis added. 
48 [1999] VSCA 100. 
49  The exception is New South Wales which provides a mechanism for reinstatement. 
50 (1997) WAIRC 528/96 7 January 1997.  
51  A similar comment was made in Mumby v Telstra Corporation Limited AIRC 873/99 P Print R7673 (29th 
July 1999) in relation to the application of similar Commonwealth workers’ compensation provisions to 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). 
52 (1998) WAIRC 1468/97 13 March 1998. 
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the dismissal may well be of no effect where the employee attains partial or total 
capacity for work in the 12 months from the day the employee becomes entitled 
to receive weekly payments of compensation from the employer. Therefore, since 
section 84AA came into effect an employer should not use the employee’s 
absence on Workers’ compensation as a reason to dismiss the employee 
particularly where, as in Mr. Pacey’s case, the absence had only just 
commenced and its duration is just not known. (In that respect, the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Cth) in section 170CK (2) (a) contains a similar, though not 
identical, restriction on dismissing an employee by reason of temporary absence 
from work because of illness or injury). If an employer did so, the dismissal may, 
depending upon the circumstances, be harsh or oppressive against the employee 
and amount to an abuse of the right to dismiss. 
 
The Commissioner went on to find that, in fact, the dismissal of Mr. Pacey had been 
harsh and oppressive.53  An order for compensation was made, but an order for 
reinstatement was not made on the grounds that section 84AA would, if Mr. Pacey 
became fit for work, entitle him to return to work in any event.  It will be observed 
that the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission had little difficulty in 
accepting that section 84AA applied to its deliberations.  Yet, there is nothing in the 
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1981 (WA) or the Industrial 
Relations Act 1979 (WA), which gives the Commission jurisdiction to deal 
specifically with such matters.  It follows that the return to work provisions do affect 
the operation of the doctrine of frustration in relation to those workers who make 
compensation claims because the provisions require the contract of employment to be 
kept on foot during the operative (usually 12 months) period. 
Alternative Duties and Frustration of Contract. 
 
Some vexed issues arise where the worker returns to work but does not perform the 
duties for which they were originally employed.  In general terms the rehabilitation 
and return to work provisions of Australian workers’ compensation statutes require 
the employer to provide duties suited to the incapacity or capacity of the worker.  
These duties may be described as light, restricted or alternative, but in any case they 
are not wholly, or indeed sometimes at all, those provided for in the original contract 
of employment.  It is arguable that a worker who returns to work on alternative duties 
commences a new contract of employment, the previous contract of employment 
having been abandoned, terminated by consent or frustrated by operation of law.  In 
which case what is the state of the varied contract?  Is the worker entitled to argue 
that there is a new or varied contract on foot?  A good example of the interaction of 
these matters is Foster v Copper Mines of Tasmania Pty Ltd54.  In Foster the worker 
had been dismissed purportedly on the grounds that for 15 months he had been unable 
to perform his full range of duties having suffered a work related accident.  He was 
performing alternative duties at the time of his dismissal.  The employer relied on the 
doctrine of frustration to end the contract.  Commissioner Simmonds said (at para 18); 
 
                                                 
53 In Carrigan v Darwin City Council the Federal Court Print 970101 20 March 1997 held that the 
equivalent Northern Territory return to work provisions, (75A of the Work Health Act (NT)) could be 
taken into account to assess whether the employer had acted in good faith, noting that these provisions in 
effect required the employer to assist the worker with rehabilitation. A breach of the return to work 
provisions might therefore be a breach of the common law implied duty of trust and confidence. 
54  [2002] PR 925813 18th December 2002 (emphasis added). 
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Consistent with the requirements of the applicable workers 
compensation legislation, the company provided Mr. Foster with 
alternative duties and he continued performing those alternative 
duties for a period greater than twelve months.  The legislation only 
requires that he not be terminated from employment for a period of 
twelve months.  If his pre-injury duties constituted his contract of 
employment, then the contract was varied or substituted as a 
consequence of the operation of the legislation and, after the expiry 
of the twelve month period, the varied or substituted contract was 
continued by consent.  Furthermore, the requirement to perform 
alternative duties was not artificially contrived.  The company 
apparently advised its insurer, from the outset of its claims in 
respect of Mr. Foster, that he was able to be placed in full-time 
gainful employment which was sufficient value so as to not require 
any contribution from the insurer. 
 
Commissioner Simmonds held the contract of employment was not frustrated and said 
(at para 19); 
 
…contrary to that finding (that the contract was frustrated), his pre-
injury contract required the performance of duties which, because 
of his injury he was unable to perform, that contract was varied 
when the company provided him with alternative duties, consistent 
with the requirements of the legislation.  The varied contract 
continued after that period required by the legislation, by consent.  
There is no evidence that the varied contract was frustrated.55
 
The Commissioner therefore held the dismissal of the worker whilst on alternative 
duties was unfair.  This was because the company did not communicate to the worker 
that it was bringing his contract to an end based on medical evidence in its possession 
which indicated he would not be able to return to full duties.  The report was stale and 
the worker was not given an opportunity to put his full and current circumstances to 
the company.  In Foster the worker complied with a program of alternative duties, but 
in Ashlin v Forestry of Tasmania56 a worker who when placed on alternative duties 
under a rehabilitation and return to work program, failed to adhere to the program and 
undertook heavy work was lawfully terminated from his employment for this breach. 
 
Where a worker is terminated contrary to law the worker may seek reinstatement.  
The question arises as to whether this is appropriate in circumstances where the 
worker has an ongoing incapacity for work albeit of a partial nature.  Such was the 
case in Smith and Kimball and others v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd57.  In Smith and 
Kimball it was found that a number of workers had been made redundant “on the 
basis of their WorkCover history or injury status”.  At the time of their appeal they 
had been absent from work nearly three years.  The employer had argued that the 
workers contracts had been frustrated.  This argument was dealt with by the Australia 
                                                 
55  Emphasis added. 
56  [2004] PR 942579 2nd April 2004. 
57  [2004] PR 942856 20th January 2004. 
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Industrial Relations Commission in Smith and Kimball noting the authority of Finch v 
Sayers and Foster (above) as well as Pasovska and adopting the approach “that there 
was relatively little room for the operation of the doctrine of frustration due to 
illness.”  The workers were reinstated with orders that the employer make available 
the position that the workers were employed in prior to their dismissal or another 
position on terms on conditions no less favourable.  Interestingly whilst apparently 
adopting Finch v Sayers the Commission noted (at para 44): 
 
However, under the general law an employer may lawfully 
terminate, or perhaps treat as frustrated, the contract of 
employment of an employee who, by reason of illness or injury, does 
not have an ongoing capacity to perform duties of the position in 
which he or she is employed.  Hence the need for provisions in 
workers compensation legislation protecting an injured employee 
for a period following the injury and a provision such as s 170CK 
(2) in the Workplace Relations Act 1996.  However, ongoing 
incapacity arising from illness or injury can certainly be a valid 
reason for termination of employment within the meaning of s 
170CG (3) (a). 
 
The Commission in Smith and Kimball did in fact note that reinstatement was to the 
substantive contractual position occupied by the applicants at the time of termination 
but also noted that this included modified duties within that position.  The effect of 
the combination of Foster and Smith and Kimball seems to be that an employer has 
little prospect of arguing successfully that a worker, who at the time of dismissal is 
performing alternative duties, should be held to have had their contract terminated by 
operation of the doctrine of frustration.  A worker undertaking modified duties may 
be held to be operating under a new varied contract or alternatively a position within 
the range of duties within the substantive contractual position.  Only when the 
workers is totally incapacitated for work might the doctrine of frustration have any 
currency, but on the authority of Pasovska an employer would be best advised not to 
rely on the doctrine of frustration but to terminate the employment by giving notice.  
Even at the point of giving notice and employer would according to Foster need to 
ensure that they were acting on current medical information.  A final word on this 
area relates to the overriding duty trust and confidence in dealing with injured 
workers.  In Carrigan v Darwin City Council58von Doussa J considered an unfair 
dismissal application under the Industrial Relations Act 1988(Cth) brought following 
a resignation by an employee who alleged that she was not provided with suitable 
duties whilst undergoing a rehabilitation program.   
 
It was alleged by the employee that she had been dismissed contrary to section 75A of 
the Work Health Act (NT) which provides that;  
 
An employer liable under this Part to compensate an injured worker 
shall - 
                                                 
58  Print 970101 20 March 1997. 
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(a) take all reasonable steps to provide the injured worker with 
suitable employment or, if unable to do so, to find suitable 
employment with another employer; and 
(b) so far as is practicable, participate in efforts to retrain the 
worker. 
 
Von Doussa J was not prepared to incorporate into the worker’s contract of 
employment a term that would reinforce this statutory obligation, despite the contract 
making reference to the need for the employer to comply with statutory requirements.  
This term was considered a "motherhood statement" not strong enough to support the 
incorporation of the return to work provisions.  Likewise, it was not considered 
appropriate to imply section 75A into the contract of employment.59  If the worker 
had been successful in regard to the latter two submissions there is no doubt that the 
Court would have had to consider the effect of not providing suitable work for the 
worker whilst she was attempting a rehabilitation program.  However, von Doussa J 
found that the employer had been in breach of an implied term as to trust and 
confidence.60  
Von Doussa J then went on to find that the employer had failed to provide the 
employee with suitable duties intending to make her work so difficult that she would 
resign, as in fact she did.  Her resignation was not voluntary.  The circumstances of 
the termination of employment constituted a constructive dismissal.61 Having 
established that the termination was at the initiative of the employer, Von Doussa J 
held that the employer’s conduct amounted to a breach of the implied term as to trust 
and confidence.  He said (at 7): 
 
Whilst I have held that the rehabilitation provisions of the Work 
Health Act do not operate as contractual provisions between the 
parties, I consider that Ms Carrigan is correct in her submission 
that a failure on the part of the Council to fulfill its rehabilitation 
obligations under the Work Health Act could amount to conduct 
likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence 
and trust between employer and employee.   
Later he found (at 19): 
 
I find that the respondent was not serious about full rehabilitation 
of the applicant.  I find this because initially the respondent took 
little or no interest in finding suitable alternative duties for the 
applicant or for putting a long-term rehabilitation program 
together.  This is evident also in the queries by Mr. Morgan 
concerning paying the applicant a lump sum. 
                                                 
59  Following Byrne & Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 where the High Court held that 
award provisions do not automatically become incorporated or implied into a contract of employment.  
Although arguably Byrne does not apply as here the question was whether an Act of Parliament should 
have been implied into the contract – given the usual prohibition on contracting out of such legislation it 
is surprising von Doussa J came to the view that the provisions were not implied into the contract. 
60  Applying Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Limited [1982] ICR 693. 
61  This concept is discussed in detail in A.A. Russian v Woolworths (SA) Pty Ltd [1995] SAIRC 59 and 
Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics (1995) 62 IR 200. 
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Von Doussa J found the applicant's termination was unfair and awarded the maximum 
(6 months wages) compensation.62  Thus whilst section 75A of the Work Health Act 
(NT) did not protect the employee from dismissal directly, it did provide a backdrop 
against which the employers conduct could be measured for the purposes of assessing 
the employers good faith in attempting to facilitate rehabilitation. 
 
As has been noted in the various judgments referred to above in addition to the 
requirement to provide suitable duties for the purpose of rehabilitation, injured 
workers have their employment protected to a degree by provisions which prevent 
employers terminating workers within prescribed time periods following an injury.  In 
some States, for example, South Australia, there is an also a provision that the 
employer must notify the regulatory authority (WorkCover) of an intention to 
terminate and give 28 days notice of that intention.63  Most frequently the 
authorisation for the employer to terminate the worker turns on the issue of whether 
the employer is able to provide suitable duties for the worker.  Where an employer is 
able to terminate the worker, the issue of frustration does not arise.  Where the 
employer is required by the regulatory authority to be more innovative and 
resourceful in providing alternative duties (as the worker is unable to perform the pre-
injury duties at all), the question of frustration could arise in a manner discussed 
above. 
On the question of the interaction between termination of employment and notice 
provisions and the doctrine of frustration in the case of Australian Rail, Tram and Bus 
Industry Union of Employees, Queensland Branch and Brisbane Transport v Brisbane 
Transport 64 Commissioner Blades dealing with an application under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1999 (Qld), noted;  
 
However, there are protections to be found in the (WorkCover) Act 
in relation to the dismissal of injured workers. Those protections 
are set out in Part 5 – Protection of Injured Employees, where s. 93 
prohibits a dismissal within 6 months after an employee becomes 
injured. Section 95 provides further protection for an injured 
worker who is dismissed after 6 months of the injury. That section 
provides that the employee may apply to the employer, within 12 
months after the injury, for reinstatement to the employee’s former 
position. First however, the employee must give the employer a 
doctor’s certificate that certifies the employee is fit for employment 
in the former position 
…On the medical evidence available to the employer at the date of 
termination, it was apparent that the incapacity was of such a 
                                                 
62  The acceptance by von Doussa J of the employers duty of trust and confidence is supported by a decision 
of the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia (of which he was a member) in Burazin v 
Blacktown City Guardian Pty Limited (1996) 142 ALR 144 at 151.   See also Perkins v Grace Worldwide 
(Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 72 IR 186 and the discussions in Naughton R ‘The Implied Obligation of Mutual 
Trust and Confidence – A new Cause of Action for Employees?’ (1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour 
Law 287 which discusses Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liq) [1997] 3 WLR 
95 and Spry M Damages for Mental Distress and the Implied contractual Term of Confidence and Trust 
(1997) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Law 292.  
63  Section 58B of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). 
64  [2003] QIRComm 299 (9 May 2003); 173 QGIG 282. 
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nature and was likely to continue for such a period that 
performance of his obligations in the future would be either 
impossible or something radically different from bus operating and 
the 3 September certificate further confirmed this opinion. 
Although probably entitled to regard the contract as being 
frustrated, the employer instead elected to terminate the contract on 
the basis of the applicant’s incapacity.  
 
It is interesting that Commissioner Blades (who cited Finch v Sayers) entertained the 
possibility of frustration of the contract of employment.  The facts of this case were 
that the worker was injured in February 2002 and as at August 2002 he was unable to 
return to work.  His employer gave him notice and on that basis the worker applied to 
the Commission to assert that the dismissal was unfair.  As at the time of hearing in 
April 2003 the worker had not been certified fit to return to work and had been paid 
compensation up until that month.  In the end result frustration of contract was not in 
issue as the Commissioner held that the worker had been dismissed in accordance 
with the governing enterprise agreement and that such dismissal was not contrary to 
the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld).  From this case it is also possible to glean 
that the workers compensation provisions which provide for return to work and 
rehabilitation will be a relevant consideration in determining termination of 
employment issues.  It is noteworthy that these provisions were not referred to in 
Pasovska. 
Implied Terms and Frustration of Contract 
 
In Finch v. Sayers the executive worker’s contract of employment did not contain any 
express terms relating to the issues of illness and incapacity.  The worker’s salary was 
fixed and his duties defined but the contract was otherwise silent as to the terms and 
conditions or employment.  Wootten J had observed in Finch v Sayers that terms 
could be implied into a contract of employment having regard to contemporary 
standards.  In H & H Security Pty Ltd v Toliopolous65 the question of what sick leave 
if any could be implied into a contract of employment for a managerial employee 
arose.  Madgwick J said; 
 
In classical legal theory, a question might arise as to whether the 
performance of the initial contract had been frustrated, although I 
think there is much to be said for the view espoused by Wootten J in 
Finch v Sayers (1976) 2 NSWLR 540, that in most areas of 
employment in modern Australia there is relatively little room for 
the operation of the doctrine of frustration due to illness. I should 
mention the analogical influence of the provision in England and at 
least three of the Australian jurisdictions of legislation for 
frustrated contracts generally, which aims to adjust the rights and 
liabilities of the parties on something fairer than an all or nothing 
basis. Section 170DF (1) (a) of the Act made it unlawful to 
terminate an employee's employment for illness- or injury-caused 
temporary absence from work. 
                                                 
65  [1997] 838 FCA (18th August 1997).  
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There is also to be taken into account the influence of general 
practices as between employer and employee in Australia. For 
example, it is quite common when an employee's sick leave runs out, 
for the employer to grant pro rata annual leave which has accrued, 
if it is sought to be taken. It is usual in Australia for a somewhat 
more generous treatment to be accorded managerial employees in 
relation to sick leave than others. There is, however, no generous 
treatment generally of employees before they have contributed a 
lengthy period of service with one employer. Five days per annum 
sick leave is a standard minimum award provision and, even where 
express provision is made for employees in managerial and more 
senior areas, it is uncommon to find more than two weeks per 
annum provided, although this is generally able to be accumulated 
for later use if untaken in a given year.66  
 
In the end result it was held that the worker was entitled to one week’s sick leave. 
Notably the Commission took into account legislation relevant to temporary 
incapacity for work.  In this case the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) was noted 
as it prohibits termination on the grounds of temporary incapacity, similar to the 
workers compensation provisions.  Again the question of implied terms was raised in 
Gawron v. SCI Operations Pty Ltd67 where Judicial Registrar Fleming noted; 
 
Mr Bingham relied on the decision of Wootten J. in Finch -v-Sayers 
[1976] 2 NSWLR 540. The facts of the decision are somewhat 
similar to this case. In that case the terms of Mr Finch's employment 
were deficient in express terms and it was thereby left to be deduced 
from the nature of his employment… 
In my view the Enterprise Agreement can be relied upon as a guide 
to the Applicant's sick leave entitlements. Mr. Rosenthal said that 
staff would be treated more generously than award workers. On this 
basis the applicant would have accumulated a minimum of 70 hours 
sick leave per year after his first year of service. On this basis the 
Applicant's sick leave should still be continuing. It is the Court's 
view that when Mr Gawron's sick leave entitlement expires, his 
employment will not automatically determine. It simply means that 
the Respondent is no longer required to pay him.68
 
As noted above a number of the above cases refer specifically to the State workers 
compensation provisions or federal industrial relations provisions which protect the 
employment of workers who have a temporary disability whether or not it is 
compensable.  Workers compensation provisions are implied into every contract of 
employment where the worker is covered by that legislation.  Since Finch v Sayers 
was decided the protections offered to workers who have sustained disability by State 
and Federal laws has considerably improved.  Commissioner Beech in the Western 
                                                 
66  Emphasis added 
67  AIRC Print (950094) VI 718 of 1994 
68  Emphasis added 
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Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Hoffman v Western Australian 
Aboriginal Media Association noted this aspect69when he said; 
 
Even so, if the common law doctrine of frustration did apply, in my 
view, it is overridden by the provisions of section 84AA of the 
Worker's Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1981.  I do agree, 
as Mr. Woodward has said, that the Commission is not the body to 
enforce the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1981. 
However, I also agree that it is a provision that I can take into 
account in exercising my discretion. I have, on two earlier 
occasions, in the case of Stockwin v. Cable Sands a matter with 
which Mr. Clohessy was involved (77 WAIG 509), and in Pacey v. 
Modular Masonry (78 WAIG 1421) had occasion to consider 
section 84AA and I was of the opinion then, and I am of the opinion 
now, that section 84AA obliges an employer to hold the employee's 
job open for 12 months whilst the employee is in receipt of worker's 
compensation.  
I am supported in that opinion by the decision of the Industrial 
Relations Court in Fernandez v. Comgroup Supplies Pty Ltd, a 
decision of Judicial Registrar Ritter of 11 December 1995. I only 
have the unreported decision. I do not have the citation of where it 
is reported. The relevance of that decision is that it leads me to the 
conclusion that section 84AA says that if somebody's absence is less 
that 12 months, then they are able to return to the job, and that is an 
indication, at least, that the length of Ms Hoffman's absence, being 
less than 12 months, does not allow frustration of the contract to 
operate.70
 
Wooten J in Finch v Sayers was not obliged to consider the return to work provisions, 
as they had no application in that case. 
 
                                                 
69  [1999] WAIRC 230 (11 October 1999) 
70  Emphasis added. 
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Reconsidering Finch v Sayers. 
 
In Finch v Sayers Wootten J built his dicta around a "contemporary understanding" of 
modern employment that employers would safeguard positions for injured or sick 
workers during their recovery.  The contemporary understanding of the employment 
relationship has altered in a number of ways since Finch v Sayers was decided. 
 
First, there is a growing acceptance (and indeed statutory obligation) for employers to 
make provision for superannuation payments.  Those payments operate as a charge 
against the employer and invariably include provision for payment of benefits upon 
the trustee being satisfied that the worker in totally incapacitated for work.  This 
suggests that in fact the parties have contracted having regard to the entitlements 
under a policy of superannuation that allows a worker to retire on the grounds of ill 
health.  It is therefore a matter that has been contemplated by the parties and is not an 
event that is outside the terms of the contract.71 How does this affect the issue of 
frustration?  It could be argued that as most superannuation policies provide coverage 
for retirement on the grounds of disability that there is not the imperative to maintain 
the contract of employment in the event of long-term absence. 
 
Second, there is an increasing prevalence of limited term contracts and a rise in casual 
and part-time employment which suggests employer resistance to provisions which 
support prolonged absence from work.   
 
Third, as noted, the almost universal inclusion of return to work provision into 
workers compensation legislation to promote rehabilitation and specific statutory 
programs focusing on rehabilitation.  These provisions, which on the one hand retard 
the application of the doctrine of frustration, also provide a guide to what might be 
regarded as a period of reasonable tolerance for long-term absence.  That is not to say 
that 12 months should be regarded as the trigger for the doctrine of frustration, but it 
is a factor which can be taken into account to show that the worker is unable to return 
to work. 
 
Fourth, although quoted frequently as supporting the proposition that tribunals should 
be slow to hold that the contract of employment is frustrated72 there has been mixed 
application of this principle with frequent findings by tribunals that in fact the 
continued absence of a worker due to illness does frustrate the contract of 
employment.  An appendix surveying the application of Finch v Sayers over the last 
20 years is attached to this paper.  It shows that tribunals have in some cases cited 
Finch v Sayers as authority to support the application of frustration to an employment 
contract. 
 
Fifth, it is clear from the appendix attached to this paper and from the discussion 
above that in fact there has frequently been a misapplication of Finch v Sayers and 
that Pasovska is recent example.  In Pasovska arguably insufficient attention was paid 
to the adoption by Wooten J in Finch v Sayers of the requirement to consider a range 
                                                 
71  McGarry G, J (1987) 'Master and Servant - incapacitating illness of servant - frustration of employment 
contract'. Australian Law Journal 6 (1) January 35 at 36. 
72  See Cachia v State Authorities Superannuation Board (1993) 47 IR 254 for another recent example of the 
adoption of Finch v Sayers, but in that case the NSW Industrial Relations Commission observed that 
frustration did not apply as the worker had been paid sick leave during his absences from work.  
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of factors.  In Finch v Sayers the worker was not actually absent from work for an 
inordinate time in comparison to many of the case detailed in the appendix below or 
indeed Pasovska.  Further the medical evidence in Finch v Sayers did not support 
ongoing total incapacity – reducing the weight which might have been attached to that 
factor.  In Finch v Sayers a key element was whether a term allowing for sick leave 
should be implied into the contract of employment.  In most cases before industrial 
tribunals this is not a consideration.  In short the dicta of Wooten J that the doctrine 
has little application in contemporary employment relationships needs to be 
considered in the context of that case, which involved consideration of the 
entitlements of managerial workers with a skeletal contract of employment who was 
absent for 9 months and who was able to return to work. 
 
Conclusions. 
Generally tribunals with jurisdiction over employment contracts have applied the 
doctrine of frustration in an inconsistent manner. The dictum of Wooten J has often 
been invoked so as to almost exclude the doctrine, although there are numerous cases 
where Finch v Sayers has been cited as authority which supports the application of the 
doctrine.  That said; the central principle which emerges from both Marshall and 
Finch v Sayers is the need to weigh a number of factors when considering the 
application of the doctrine to employment circumstances.   
 
Pasovska is important because the facts related to a long-term totally incapacitated 
worker who had received compensation for an extended period and had been afforded 
the protection of statutory return to work provisions and as such was a case where the 
doctrine of frustration was most likely to have application.  It can easily be 
distinguished from Finch v Sayers on its facts.  As has been argued the case should be 
viewed cautiously because the over emphasis on the failure of the employer to give 
notice. 
 
Finch v Sayers needs reconsideration in that the work and industrial relations 
environment of the 1970’s when that case was decided has evolved so that many of 
the protections such as Superannuation schemes, sick leave, anti-discrimination 
provisions relating to disability which were not then available are now mandated into 
employment contracts.  Inattentive application of the dicta from Finch v Sayers may 
not serve workers well in the long term as Pasovska has shown the likelihood is that 
employers will give workers notice in order to be sure that contracts are bought to an 
end.  Because Pasovska has placed the question of notice squarely in the minds of 
employers they will need to ensure that they allow sufficient time between the worker 
being unable to return to work and giving notice.  The Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) is a guide to the period to allow, namely at least six months, but in the case of 
compensable claims the period before notice can be given will be 12 months. 
This survey has also shown that in giving notice to a worker who apparently is unable 
to return to their pre-accident employment the employer must only act where is in 
possession of current medical evidence and where that medical evidence has been 
made available for comment to the worker.  The cases lend very little support to 
employers who attempt to terminate the employment of workers in alternative duties 
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if those duties are being adequately performed.  It follows that whilst Pasovska may 
have been a victory for one worker it may be a prompt for employers to act with less 
sympathy towards injured workers, but at the same time, employers who act with 
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